1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
3	SOUTHERN DIVISION
4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
5	Plaintiff, No. 1:17cr130
6	vs.
7	DANIEL GISSANTANER,
8	Defendant.
9	Before:
10	THE HONORABLE JANET NEFF,
11	U.S. District Judge Grand Rapids, Michigan
12	Thursday, March 22, 2018  Motion Proceedings
13	APPEARANCES:
14	MR. ANDREW BIRGE, U.S. ATTORNEY
15	By: MR. JUSTIN PRESANT The Law Building
16	330 Ionia Avenue, NW Grand Rapids, MI 49501-0208
17	616-456-2404
18	On behalf of the Plaintiff;
19	FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS By: MS. JOANNA CHRISTINE KLOET
20	MR. PEDRO CELIS Federal Public Defender's Office
21	50 Louis NW Suite 300
22	Grand Rapids, MI 49503 616-742-7420
23	On behalf of the Defendant.
24	
25	REPORTED BY: MS. KATHY J. ANDERSON, RPR, FCRR

March 22, 2018 1 PROCEEDINGS, 10:07 a.m. 2 THE LAW CLERK: All rise, please. Court is now in 3 session. Please be seated. 4 THE COURT: Good morning, everybody. 5 MS. KLOET: Good morning. 6 THE COURT: I have had more mouse problems today. 7 This is the date and time that is set for hearing on a couple 8 of government motions in case number 1:17cr130, the United 9 States of America versus Daniel, is it Gissantaner. 10 Gissantaner. How is it properly pronounced? 11 MS. KLOET: Gissantaner, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Counsel, would you please put your 13 appearances on the record for me and any introductions of 14 people who are at counsel table. 15 MR. PRESANT: Good morning, Your Honor. 16 Justin Presant for the United States. With me at counsel table 17 this morning is ATF Special Agent Jeff Kitchen. 18 THE COURT: Kitchen. 19 MR. PRESANT: Kitchen, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Spelled the normal way? 21 MR. PRESANT: It is, Your Honor. 22 23 THE COURT: Thank you. MS. KLOET: Good morning, Your Honor. Joanna Kloet, 24 Assistant Public Defender, and to my left is Pedro Celis our 25

research and writing specialist attorney, and to his left is Mr. Gissantaner.

THE COURT: Great. In addition to the hearing on the motions this morning, there are a couple of housekeeping things we need to talk about, but I think we will defer those until I've decided the motions after argument.

There is one I do have a question on before we get started.

There's a reference somewhere in the defendant's documents to this being a second, it sounded like it was a second trial. But is it accurate to say that what you were referencing was an MDOC proceeding?

MS. KLOET: That is accurate, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KLOET: There was a hearing, a merits hearing at the MDOC.

THE COURT: And the result was?

MS. KLOET: He was acquitted on the charge of felon in possession.

THE COURT: Based on?

MS. KLOET: Based on the evidence that was presented in that hearing which did not include the DNA evidence and likelihood ratio that is at issue in these motions.

THE COURT: Okay. Great. All right. We are first going to take up the government's motion to quash the defense

subpoenas which were served on I believe two federal employees who are employed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. So, Mr. Presant, you're up.

MR. PRESANT: Thank you, Your Honor. The government's motions are or the government's arguments I should say are set forth in the motion that it filed on the issue. I'll briefly summarize those arguments and then take any questions that the Court has of course.

The basis for the motion to quash really are federal regulations that have been approved of by the Supreme Court, or at least the general class of regulations, if not the regulation itself at issue in this case, has been approved by the United States Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Touhy versus Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, and that's a 1951 case out of the Supreme Court.

And the rationale behind the Touhy regulations of course is that the government has an interest in conserving its resources. The resources being the time of federal employees whose job it is not to be professional expert witnesses.

THE COURT: The government also has an interest,

Mr. Presant, in not convicting people on insufficient evidence.

And so when it comes down to balancing the government interest in preserving resources, and the defendant's right to be tried on proper evidence, resources loses.

MR. PRESANT: I agree with that general concept, Your

Honor, with some caveats. One caveat being the type of witness at issue here. These are witnesses who the defendant wants to call as opinion witnesses and not fact witnesses.

THE COURT: Well, that's not quite accurate. As I understand it, and as I understand what the precedent provides, is that while they may not be properly asked for opinion testimony, they can be properly queried with regard to conclusions that they have reached from their research.

And it just seems to me that — I really do think, I'll tell you honestly, before this case I had never heard of the Touhy regulations. So we had to do a lot of digging. And it's pretty clear that the law in this particular area is not black and white, as it were. And what I understand, and certainly Ms. Kloet can speak for herself, but my understanding is not that they are looking for opinion testimony on the particular facts of this case or the particular DNA of this case, but their expertise which apparently is considerable on this relatively new, and again based on our research, relatively untested in the courts form of DNA testing.

So go from there, if you would.

MR. PRESANT: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate the opportunity to address that.

So as an initial matter, Drs. Lund and Iyer, I believe they are doctors though I haven't seen their C.V.s, I assume they are given their expertise, I understand them to be experts

in statistics, not in DNA analysis, not in probabilistic genotyping.

THE COURT: But probabilistic genotyping comes up with a statistical number, right?

MR. PRESANT: It does. And so what their paper says, to the extent I can understand it, and it is, it's a very dense paper, I have read things about that paper that say you need to have a background and expertise in statistics to even understand what they're saying. So I think I have some grasp of what they are trying to say in their paper.

And based on my understanding of that paper, what it's really about is how likelihood ratios can be used in the courtroom as applied to all forensic discipline. So, yes, STRmix and probabilistic genotyping end in a likelihood ratio, as do other forms of forensic evidence that are presented in court, including in paternity testing, paternity forensic DNA analysis results in likelihood ratio, and there's been a proposal to adopt likelihood ratios in other forensic disciplines where they are not being used where they could be used. And there are some good arguments for doing that, and I think what their paper is really about is urging caution in wide spread adoption of likelihood ratios because of what are really abstract statistical concerns about that.

However, I think Drs. Lund and Iyer also acknowledge that likelihood ratios are appropriate in some applications in

court. And if there's any application that likelihood ratios are appropriate in, it's in DNA forensic analysis.

THE COURT: Well, and that, you know, what you have just described, Mr. Presant, really seems to me to argue for bringing them in to explain that all to me. It really does. Because I have to tell you that I took one statistics class in undergraduate school about a hundred years ago, and I hated every minute of it. But it just seems to me that this area, and I've done some reading, I didn't look very closely at the exhibits -- we are going to have to talk about that later -- but it just seems to me that where you have the kind of situation that faces us here, as I said earlier, a relatively new, relatively untested in the courts scientific testing regimen, and lay people, a lay person, this judge, who has to make a decision whether it is admissible or not admissible, that as much information as is available, as much expertise that we can call on argues for bringing these people forward.

And, again, based on our review of the legal landscape with regard to the Touhy issue, I don't see any impediment to me ordering them to come. Affidavit or no affidavit.

MR. PRESANT: Your Honor, I would like to address the legal issue, but if I may, in preparing for today's hearing I also came across just a two-page relatively short question and answer type article from "IDentification News." It's written by John Paul Jones who interviews the two authors about

likelihood ratios. And to me it made their opinions much more accessible and I think it will shed some light on the issue for the Court. And I provided a copy to defense counsel. So I'll hand that up to the Court now.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. PRESANT: And I just like to direct the Court to I think what is ultimately the main issue here which is on the back side of the question and answer. And the second to last question that they're asked in this article is, "Do you feel that LR, likelihood ratios, should not be used in courtroom testimony?" And they say: "No, that is not our view. While we do not consider it proven that likelihood ratios are the final answer and recognize their limitations, they may be the best communication strategy currently available in many forensic applications if one accepts the idea that the role of the expert is to effectively summarize the relevant information in the form of a 'weight of evidence'." And --

THE COURT: Again, that just seems to scream, let me hear from these people.

MR. PRESANT: Well, I understand that, Your Honor, that we certainly, we certainly could bring them here, or the defense could bring them here, if the Court lets the motion, or the subpoena stand. But I think the question is what's the limiting principle on that? I understand this is just one case. And they could be brought here, and maybe some other

judge in some other case down the line can see what the actual burden is on this. But I submit to the Court that the rationale behind the Touhy regulations has to have some effect in terms of weighing the government's interests and having experts fly across the country here, they could fly across the country in every case in which likelihood ratios are used, every paternity lawsuit, every instance in which DNA evidence is presented in the form of likelihood ratios. And if all they are going to come and say is, well, we should be cautious in adopting likelihood ratios in other forensic disciplines but likelihood ratios may be the best thing that are currently available to communicate the conclusions of forensic analysis in court, that is a burden on scientists whose job it is to conduct research like that submitted by the defendant for a relatively marginal benefit.

The government has no issue with the Court considering their paper, has no issue with the Court considering their statements in other articles.

THE COURT: Well, you've already said that the paper is very dense, and I take you at your word. And I am not ready to accept, what is this, maybe a hundred words in this paragraph as the be all and end all. It just seems to me, and, you know, the argument that the slippery slope and all that sort of stuff, that argument is made so many times. If this technology is as good as the government believes it is, it will

eventually, maybe after this case and another case, and a third case, it will gain the kind of acceptance that other kinds of forensic evidence have such as, fingerprints; I mean nobody questions, although I guess now some people are beginning to, but nobody has questioned fingerprint evidence for probably 50 years. But early on, I'm guessing, there were some smart lawyers who did.

And so if it does, if it is as good as you think it is, sooner or later, and it may cause some inconvenience to the government, and maybe will cause a little bit of expense, sooner or later, it will get there. And whenever the government provides this evidence with the proper foundation, there won't be any question. The defendants will stipulate to it, just as they stipulate to other kinds of scientific testing. I'm thinking of breathalyzer tests, same thing. You know, when I was early in practice they were relatively new and there were challenges to them. Some successful. And now, you know, if you can show that the operator made sure that the air passage was clear, made sure that the defendant didn't have anything in his mouth and all of that, the results are not challenged in court.

And, again, you know, as I said, I think if that is your strongest argument, it's not a strong argument at all.

MR. PRESANT: And I just want to make sure that the record is clear. The Court understands that these experts if

they are called will not testify about STRmix or probabilistic genotyping typing, they are strictly, my understanding is, they are going to testify about likelihood ratios and Bayesian decision theory and the effect of that -- the effect or how those statistics can be presented in court. So they aren't going to testify about the technology. They haven't studied the technology. They don't understand the technology. Though I haven't talked to them. I could be wrong about that. But that's my understanding based on everything that's been submitted in the case. They're just going to talk about the numbers, and so I don't think they will have anything to say about STRmix or probabilistic genotyping.

THE COURT: Well, let's hear from Ms. Kloet. She might be able to enlighten us.

MR. PRESANT: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Presant.

MS. KLOET: Your Honor, I'm happy to address the Court on the substance of what their testimony would be. To the extent to which the Court wants to address Touhy regulations, Mr. Celis prepared that response and he is prepared.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KLOET: I think the Court has stated it well to the -- I intend to have Iyer and Lund come here to explain their findings as fact witnesses. To do that they're going to have to explain some really high level statistical concepts

like Bayesian decision making theory and how that applies to its use in probabilistic genotyping systems. I mean they are not creators of probabilistic genotyping systems but because that type of system generates a likelihood ratio, they may have to testify regarding how that, how those statistical principles apply in the context of PGS.

I think they are necessary because I mean, Your Honor, as a non scientist, non mathematician, this article was inscrutable. It took me weeks, months to get through it and just to emerge with some sort of rudimentary understanding of what the gist of what they are saying is.

I have had an opportunity to communicate with them. And I do believe their testimony will be very helpful to the Court in understanding the underlying principles, how it applies to especially complex mixtures that are at issue in this particular case.

THE COURT: Well, again, after listening to

Mr. Presant, I am more convinced that you're correct, and as to

the question of the necessity, whether they are necessary, I

think that is really more a judgment for defense counsel to

make than for me to make, or Mr. Presant.

If, you know, in evaluating your defense of Mr. Gissantaner, if it is your professional judgment that this testimony is necessary for your proper preparation and presentation, then I think that Mr. Presant's argument to the

contrary really is essentially irrelevant, honestly. You know, it's not a relevance argument. It's an argument we don't need this testimony, and the defense thinks it is necessary.

So to that extent, I think I get your argument. I agree with it.

If Mr. Celis wants to put some brief argument on the record with regard to the Touhy regulations, I think I can then make a --

MR. CELIS: Your Honor, I don't think that's necessary in this case. I will think we can stand on the arguments we made in our response as they relate to the Touhy regulations.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I'm not even going to cite any case law. As I said, I think that the case law -- well maybe I should in deciding the motion.

First of all, the question of procedural compliance with the agency's regulations, where the agency hasn't even said that they believe their regulations have been violated, the agency itself hasn't raised this issue; we don't know what the agency thinks. I assume that Mr. Presant has been in contact with the NIST counsel or somebody that is related to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, but we don't even know if they have a position on whether the Touhy, or whether the, their regulations have been offended in any way by the defendant, and the defendant argues I think fairly persuasively that they haven't. Mr. Presant.

MR. PRESANT: May I address that, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. PRESANT: So the subpoenas were brought to my attention because NIST counsel turned them over to me. This is my first encounter with Touhy as well. But my understanding is it's a routine matter when agency employees are subpoenaed for them to turn it over to their counsel who then contacts the relevant U.S. Attorney's office to file the motion to quash.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PRESANT: So the motion to quash was filed at the request of agency's counsel.

THE COURT: Got you. Okay. Thank you. So now that is cleared up. We do have some basis to believe that the agency does not -- wishes to quash these, these subpoenas.

But in, again, the case law, and I'm looking for the full cite, the case law says, and this is not exactly a quote, but, and we couldn't find anything directly on point, but the case law essentially says, that a federal agency's Touhy regulations do not control a federal court's evidentiary decisions including the issuance of subpoenas for testimony of a federal employee in cases in which the United States is a party. And that's 93 -- what is that cite, Kathie -- Federal Claims at 380. And further, where such regulations are clearly in conflict with the Court's authority as set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the rules of court, they can have

no force or effect. And for that I would cite Romero versus the United States, 153 Federal Rules decision, 649, U.S. v Henson, 123 F.3d 1226, disapproved on other grounds in U.S. versus Foster, 165 F.3d, 689, U.S. ex rel. O'Keefe versus McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 132 F.3d 1252.

And then the Supreme Court has said they looked at the Housekeeping statute and held it does not provide statutory authority for substantive regulations, Upsher-Smith Labs versus Fifth Third Bank, the 16cv556, the Westlaw cite is 2017 WL7369881.

So the bottom line is that the motion to quash is properly decided by this Court under the Rules of Evidence and the court rules that are applicable. And I believe that the testimony which the defendant wishes to bring forward has a high likelihood of being relevant, and even more significantly, of doing what expert testimony is supposed to do, and that is educating the Court. I think that all of us, all of us lawyers in this matter come to this issue, this DNA issue, I can't even remember what, SXT --

THE LAW CLERK: STR.

THE COURT: -- from a decided disadvantage. I'm sure not a scientist, and I need to understand this stuff before I can make an informed decision. And so the more help I can get, the better off we will all be.

So the government's motion to quash is denied.

The other thing I would say, and I don't know whether it was the defense pointed this out or whether it was

Ms. Geiger, my law clerk, but in doing some reading on this stuff, it's pretty clear that there's a lot of research still going on and it may well be that these two authors will have something that has come to them, or that their work has discovered since they wrote the paper. And, again, if that's the case, boy, I would love to know it. I really would.

So the motion to quash is respectfully denied.

All right. Now, the next motion we have before us is the government's motion to exclude the defense witness Nathan Adams. Or to delay the Daubert hearing. That latter I think is pretty much moot. And I think I pretty much understand your argument, Mr. Presant. It's a fairly technical one. I think you would agree. But if you want to put something on the record, please do so now.

MR. PRESANT: I'll be brief, Your Honor. And I agree that given the rescheduling of the hearing anyway, the alternative form of relief may be moot.

The issue really is just to make sure that whatever challenges the defendant is bringing in the Daubert motion are joined.

I reviewed very carefully the motion that was filed back in December, and Ms. Kloet provided contemporaneous or near contemporaneous disclosure of one expert, Dr. Julie

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Howenstine, and I think Ms. Kloet and I have had a lot of conversations about the anticipated expert testimony for the Daubert hearing in the time since that initial disclosure. And so I think that the government has therefore prepared its experts to respond in part to some of the opinions that it believes Dr. Howenstine is going to offer at the Daubert hearing.

I think the disclosure with respect to Mr. Adams which happened on March 12th of this year, some nearly three months after the initial motion was filed along with the initial disclosure of Dr. Howenstine, are different in kind from the types of arguments raised in that motion. I understand Mr. Adams's arguments are going to be directed more towards the software engineering and the computer coding behind STRmix as opposed to what is probabilistic genotyping, what is STRmix, how does it work, how is that evidence then presented in court, what are the biological and chemical processes that lead ultimately to the likelihood ratio that's presented in court. Those are all the things the government was prepared to present evidence on, whereas Mr. Adams is really talking about coding. And from the very little time that I have had to -- well, so, just to finish that thought and tie it off. The government if that's what's going to be at issue in this motion just wants to be able to respond appropriately.

THE COURT: Is the government also expecting or

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

contemplating hiring its own expert on the coding issue, on the software issue?

MR. PRESANT: Well, I want to review the issue. mean I have taken a very cursory look so far at Mr. Adams's qualifications, and the opinions he might be qualified to render, and there are some things that are concerning to the government about whether he really is qualified to offer the opinions that he's been tendered for. I haven't had enough time to review that sufficiently where I feel confident in taking a position one way or the other, but it may be that the appropriate action for the government to take is to move to exclude him because of his lack of qualifications or expertise to render an opinion on that issue. It may be the appropriate course of action is for the government to hire its own expert to respond to those issues, or it may be that even if the Court is going to receive his opinion based on what qualifications he has, that cross-examination would be sufficient in order for the government to meet its burden under Daubert. But the government just wants additional time to review those options to make sure that the issue is joined.

THE COURT: How much time do you think you would need?

MR. PRESANT: In our motion we ask for 45 days from today's hearing. And really I wouldn't ask for that much time ordinarily but it is highly technical.

THE COURT: I don't think that's a lot of time, to be

honest with you. You know, I think that's a very reasonable position in terms of timing.

Have you done a calculation of how much time is left on the speedy trial clock?

MR. PRESANT: I don't believe we have speedy trial issues in this case, Your Honor, because the pending motions tolled the Speedy Trial Act. I would be interested to hear Ms. Kloet's position on that issue. But, no, I haven't done that calculation. But I think because of the motions for ends of justice that were filed by Ms. Kloet in preparing the original Daubert motion, and then the fact that that motion has been pending, the two motions before the Court have been pending, I think all of that time would be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act.

THE COURT: It might behoove you to try to figure that out anyway.

MR. PRESANT: I will certainly will look into it. And the only other issue I'll add on this if the Court is inclined to delay the hearing, the two experts the government was planning to call at today's hearing they are both with the Michigan State Police, Dr. Jeffrey Nye who is a member of SWGDAM is SWGDAM, which is the national governing body for -- which stands for the Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods. I know. It's a world of acronyms we are living in now between STRmix and SWGDAM. And I'll stop saying them for

the benefit of the stenographer. But our two experts were holding this date, and they have some things on their calendar that they asked me to make the Court aware of. And I can get in touch with your case manager if we are trying to find a new date because I would like to do whatever we can to accommodate their schedules.

THE COURT: I understand. And I agree. And Rick will work with you in finding another date.

MR. PRESANT: Thank you, Your Honor, I appreciate it.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Kloet. You want to respond?

MS. KLOET: Sure. Briefly, Your Honor. I just wanted to underscore the importance of Mr. Adams's testimony for the Court.

The science or technology in front of the Court really, at the risk of oversimplification can be distilled into three separate areas of expertise and that is DNA forensic analysis, statistics, and software.

Mr. Adams, his testimony would be largely about the fact that there are well-established standards for testing and developing software and they were not met here. They have been applied to Smart phone apps, airline navigator systems, they have been established for decades, and they were not met here.

His testimony will supplement Dr. Howenstine's testimony as to the forensic DNA forensic testing, and also the testimony of Drs. Lund and Iyer with respect to the

statistical --

THE COURT: You don't disagree, do you, that the government should have an ample opportunity to do the three things that Mr. Presant just talked about, review Mr. Adams's qualifications, decide whether to challenge him on his qualifications, decide whether cross-examination is going to be sufficient, and decide whether to call their own expert. You don't disagree with any of that, do you?

MS. KLOET: No, Your Honor. I think both parties need time to do that, absolutely.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further?

MS. KLOET: No, Your Honor. Just that what

Mr. Presant said about me keeping him apprised in real time as

I was searching for an expert is accurate. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. The, under Rule 16, as I'm sure the parties know or counsel knows, I've got pretty broad remedial powers in regulating discovery. And I think that to some extent we can excuse the defense's lapse, I think there was a lapse here, but for -- because this case is a fairly complicated one, and one involving an evidentiary issue that none of us is really all that familiar with, I think we can exclude the possibility of a dismissal as a result of any potential violation of the court rules in naming an expert and so forth.

In addition to that, the stakes in this case are very

high. Mr. Gissantaner is facing a charge which carries a mandatory 15-year minimum sentence. And that's, that's a big deal. It's a big deal to me. I'm quite sure it's a big deal to him, and I think it's probably a big deal to the government too. And so I don't think it is at all off the mark to say that Mr. Adams should be allowed to testify as an expert subject to the Daubert hearing, of course, and without any sanctions of any kind. I just think that we are all grappling with a situation that is not familiar to any of us, and we are doing the best we can.

So for purposes of the ruling on the motion, the motion to exclude the defense witness is, well, it's granted in part and denied in part. It's granted to the extent that we are going to reschedule the Daubert hearing. It's denied in terms of the motion to exclude Adams as a witness.

Counsel will confer with the Court's case manager to find a new date for the Daubert hearing.

I want to go back just one second to the ruling on the motion to quash. Not only are the Touhy regulations an area of novelty for all of us, it really seems to me, and I haven't obviously read all the cases, but it really seems to me that for the most part the case law that has dealt with them has been on the civil side of the courtroom. And we're dealing with different priorities on the criminal side. And I think that argues even more strongly for the Court to have

discretion. I don't think, I don't think I need any more authority for that proposition. But to the extent that it simply bolsters my conclusion, I offer that for the record for whatever it's worth.

Now, housekeeping. Kathie, do you have those binders there? Ms. Kloet provided the Court with a gigantic stack of loose exhibits. My JA was nice enough to hole punch them and put them into binders. I'm going to give those binders back to Ms. Kloet with the instructions that she is to, number one, prepare an index which not only identifies the exhibit but gives at least a brief description of what it is and what it's relevant to. And secondly, that she tabs each one. It would be nice to have a divider, a tab divider between each exhibit.

Was there anything else, Kathie, that I needed to address this morning?

THE LAW CLERK: We are all set on the speedy trial.

THE COURT: Yeah, they're going to deal with Rick and they will figure it out.

THE LAW CLERK: But we do need to hear from the defense?

THE COURT: Maybe we do. That's a good idea.

Mr. Gissantaner, you have sat through this and I know that you were not particularly interested in any further delays. And I understand that. But my question to you is even -
Mr. Presant may well be correct that the speedy trial clock is

not running, but do you have any objection to us putting this 1 case out further into the schedule to allow everybody, 2 including me, to really get up to speed and understand the 3 nature of the evidence that the government wants to present 4 against you? Do you have any objection to the delay that is 5 going to probably be, I'm quessing more than 45 days, partly 6 because my schedule in May and April is just jammed. 7 So can you tell me what your thinking is on the delay? 8 THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am, Your Honor. 9 interests of fundamental fairness, I think he deserves the 10 right to prepare anything he deems necessary. And I think the 11 Court should have the right to explore and make a decision 12 based on that. I just want to be treated fairly. 13 THE COURT: Well, that's my goal too. 14 THE DEFENDANT: That's it. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, I appreciate your 16 comments, Mr. Gissantaner. 17 What else, Kathie, anything? 18 THE LAW CLERK: No, I believe that's it. 19 THE COURT: Mr. Presant, anything further? 20 MR. PRESANT: No, thank you, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Ms. Kloet. 22 23 MS. KLOET: No, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you both. Thank you all. 24 And we are adjourned for today. 25

```
THE LAW CLERK: All rise. Court is adjourned.
 1
                    (Proceedings concluded, 10:50 a.m.)
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Kathy J. Anderson, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct transcript of the proceedings had in the within entitled and numbered cause on the date hereinbefore set forth; and I do further certify that the foregoing transcript has been prepared by me or under my direction.

## /s/ Kathy J. Anderson

Kathy J. Anderson, RPR, FCRR
U.S. District Court Reporter
412 Federal Building
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503